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Abstract 21 
Purpose: To explore how reasons to lie impact upon the Decision component of Activation-22 
Decision-Construction-Action Theory. Specifically, the study looked at how beneficiary of 23 
the lie (self vs. another) and additional cost of lying (no cost vs. cost to self/other) might 24 
influence decisions to lie.  25 
Method: Ninety-one undergraduate students read four hypothetical scenarios representing 26 
the four reasons to lie. They stated whether they would decide to tell the truth/lie for each 27 
scenario and also estimated the probability and valence of being believed, or not, if they did 28 
decide to tell the truth/lie. These estimations were inputted into the ADCAT formulae. 29 
Results:  Higher expected values of truth-telling only reduced likelihood to decide to lie 30 
when the lie benefitted another. The beneficiary of the lie and additional cost did not 31 
moderate any of the relationships between the ADCAT variables and hypothetical decisions 32 
to lie. However, additional cost (e.g., cost to self or another) was a significant predictor of 33 
anticipated lying behaviour. The more likely there was a cost to self or other, the less likely 34 
the participants were to decide to lie. 35 
Conclusions:  Weighing up the expected cost and benefits of truth-telling and lying was 36 
associated with hypothetical decisions to lie or not. However, other variables, such as 37 
additional cost to self or another, should be considered in the ADCAT model to extend our 38 
understanding of this decision-making process. Future research is required to investigate 39 
whether these relationships can be manipulated to promote honesty and deter deceit.  40 
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Exploring the Decision Component of Activation-Decision-Construction-Action 46 
Theory for Different Reasons to Deceive 47 
To deceive or not to deceive, that is the question. Deception is defined as “a 48 
successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a 49 
belief which the communicator considers to be untrue” (Vrij, 2008, p. 15). Deception can 50 
take many different forms, from outright lies that involve complete fabrications (Vrij, 2008) 51 
to embedded lies that incorporate truthful information to create the lie (Vrij, Granhag & 52 
Porter, 2010) to deception through the omission of truthful information (Lyon, Malloy, Quas 53 
& Talwar, 2008). Most theories and models of deception focus on the emotional and 54 
cognitive processes involved in telling a successful lie itself (e.g., Interpersonal Deception 55 
Theory, Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Working Memory Model, Sporer, 2016; Cognitive Lie 56 
Detection, Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011), leading to new interview techniques to 57 
improve lie detection. However, understanding the processes behind deciding to tell the truth 58 
or a lie in the first place would perhaps enable us to design better strategies to reduce, or even 59 
eliminate, deception in investigative interviews. 60 
Based on the Rational Choice Theory (i.e., a general approach to understanding social 61 
decision-making), Activation-Decision-Construction-Action-Theory (ADCAT, Walczyk, 62 
Harris, Duck & Mulay, 2014) has adapted cost-benefit formulae put forward by Stanovich 63 
(2010) to reflect quasi-rational decision-making. Providing a comprehensive framework that 64 
maps deception from start to finish, ADCAT is the only cognitive model of deception to 65 
isolate the Decision component and provide calculable formulae for predicting truth/lie 66 
decision-making. Walczyk et al. (2014) explain that this decision-making process is only 67 
quasi-rational because actual likelihoods and costs/benefits are unknown. This means that 68 
only estimates of these outcomes are used to evaluate options and to come to a final decision 69 
that best optimises goal attainment. In line with Truth-Default Theory (Levine, 2014), 70 
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ADCAT assumes that people will deceive as little as possible to achieve their goals (Walczyk 71 
et al., 2014). However, this infers that, sometimes, deception will be necessary for goal 72 
attainment. 73 
When applied to deception, the cost-benefit calculations of the ADCAT model 74 
(Walczyk et al., 2014) can be broken down into three steps. First, the expected value of truth-75 
telling is calculated by multiplying the probability and valence of truth-telling and being 76 
believed, multiplying the probability of truth-telling and not being believed, and then adding 77 
these values together. Second, the expected value of lying is calculated using the same 78 
formula, except that ratings relate to telling a lie and being believed, or not. For calculating 79 
both expected values (EV), the formula is: EVtruth/lie = (pbelieved x vbelieved) + (pnot_believed x 80 
vnot_believed). Third, motivation to lie is calculated by subtracting the expected value of truth-81 
telling from the expected value of lying: M = EVlie - EVtruth (see Supplementary Materials for 82 
an example of these calculations). Based on these formulae, Walczyk et al. (2014) predicted 83 
that (1) expected value of truth-telling would negatively correlate with decision to lie, and (2) 84 
motivation to lie would positively correlate with the decision to lie.  This theory, therefore, is 85 
designed to predict truth/lie behaviours. 86 
Due to the novelty of ADCAT, there are very few published studies that have 87 
employed this model. In fact, only two studies (Masip, Blandón-Gitlin, de la Riva & Herrero, 88 
2016; Walczyk, Tcholakian, Newman & Duck, 2016) to date have tested the Decision 89 
component and its formulae. First, Masip et al. (2016) used hypothetical scenarios typical for 90 
an undergraduate population (e.g., a friend cheating on a test or witnessing a theft). They 91 
found that the expected value of truth-telling was negatively correlated with deciding to lie 92 
and that motivation to lie was positively correlated with deciding to lie. Thus, both of 93 
Walczyk et al.’s (2014) predictions were supported. However, their findings showed no 94 
relationship between the expected value of lying and deciding to lie.  Second, Walczyk et al. 95 
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(2016) investigated impromptu decisions to lie when asked embarrassing questions during a 96 
mock job interview.  They also found that the expected value of truth-telling was negatively 97 
correlated with deciding and actually telling a lie in the interview. Contrary to Masip et al. 98 
(2016), they did find a positive relationship between the expected value of lying and actual 99 
lying behaviour. Together the studies present mixed findings, with more testing required to 100 
understand whether the expected value of lying, in particular, is related to a decision to lie or 101 
not.  102 
Building on this previous research, we explored whether reasons to lie might 103 
influence decisions to lie or tell the truth. As proposed by ADCAT, reasons for lying can 104 
largely depend on the perceived benefits and costs of that lie (Walczyk et al., 2014; Walczyk 105 
et al., 2016). The beneficiary of the lie (self or other) and the protection from harm (i.e., cost) 106 
that the lie affords the beneficiary are important motives (Vrij, 2007; 2008). Self-oriented 107 
lies, also known as ‘antisocial’ or ‘self-serving’ lies, are largely discouraged because they 108 
primarily serve to protect the liar (Hsieh, 2004). For example, an antisocial lie might include 109 
falsely telling your lecturer that your grandparent has passed away to be able to re-sit an 110 
exam. Other-oriented lies, also referred to as ‘prosocial’ or ‘polite’ lies, are perceived to be 111 
more socially tolerable than self-oriented lies because they aim to benefit others (Backbier, 112 
Hoogstraten & Terwogt-Kouwenhoven, 1997; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer & Epstein, 113 
1996; Dunbar et al., 2016). This preference for prosocial lies has also been found cross-114 
culturally (Seiter, Bruschke & Bai, 2002). An example of an other-oriented lie is receiving an 115 
undesirable gift (e.g., an unattractive shirt) from a dear relative and feigning delight at 116 
receiving such a gift so as not to offend the gift-giver. When deciding on the acceptability of 117 
lying and truth-telling in a given situation, adults appear to use a model of practical 118 
reasoning, whereby they adapt their reasoning to suit the needs of that situation (Lavoie, 119 
Leduc, Crossman & Talwar, 2016, O’Neill, 2007). If there is a need to protect a dear relative 120 
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from becoming upset, then an other-oriented lie might be acceptable. This could explain why 121 
the most frequent form of lies are other-oriented, aimed at protecting someone else from 122 
harm (Serota & Levine, 2015). A preference for other-oriented lying could, therefore, be due 123 
to weighing up the benefits of resolving the need against the costs of not protecting another 124 
from harm. 125 
Truth-telling and lying could also involve an additional cost to the self or another. 126 
Self-oriented lies could involve placing the blame on someone else (e.g., saying that a 127 
younger sibling broke the family heirloom, when, in fact, it was oneself). Additionally, other-128 
oriented lies could involve placing the blame on oneself (e.g., the deceiver falsely admitting 129 
guilt for breaking the family heirloom when, in fact, it was his/her younger sibling). The 130 
perception of potential harm is a strong predictor of moral judgments, with immoral acts 131 
being linked to suffering (Gray & Schein, 2016; Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012). A primary 132 
function of these judgments is to guide practical reasoning (Cushman & Young, 2009) so that 133 
in the case of self-oriented lies, with a cost to another, the need of the older sibling must 134 
significantly outweigh the suffering of the younger sibling to warrant deception. Other-135 
oriented lies, with a cost to self, present a different situation. Here, the self-sacrifice of the 136 
older sibling to protect the younger sibling would constitute altruism. Evolutionary 137 
psychologists theorise that altruism is a key motivator for prosocial behaviour that has 138 
evolved through natural selection, resulting in generations with more empathic concern 139 
(Berk, 2013). This could explain why the more the deception becomes altruistically-140 
motivated, the more the deception is rated as acceptable (Seiter et al., 2002). Metaphorically, 141 
falling on one’s sword would, therefore, be preferable to stabbing someone else. 142 
Our aims were, therefore, not only to further test the predicted relationships within the 143 
Decision component of the ADCAT model but also to add to this literature by exploring how 144 
these relationships might be influenced by different reasons to lie. We firstly hypothesised 145 
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that expected value of truth-telling would negatively correlate with the decision to lie. Our 146 
second hypothesis was that the expected value of lying would positively correlate with the 147 
decision to lie. Thirdly, we predicted that motivation to lie would also negatively correlate 148 
with the decision to lie. Finally, being the first study to look at the Decision component of 149 
ADCAT for different reasons to lie, we proposed some explorative tests. We expected three-150 
way interactions in that beneficiary of the lie and an additional cost would moderate the 151 
relationships between the expected value of truth-telling and decision to lie and the expected 152 
value of lying and decision to lie. In particular, we predicted that when the beneficiary of the 153 
lie was oneself, an additional cost to an ‘innocent’ other was at stake, and, thus, the expected 154 
value of truth-telling was high, then the participant would be most likely to decide not to lie. 155 
We also predicted that when the beneficiary of the lie was another, an additional cost to 156 
oneself demonstrating one’s altruism was at stake, and, thus, the expected value of lying was 157 
expected to be higher, then the participant would be most likely to decide to lie. 158 
In addition to the expected theoretical implications of analysing the Decision 159 
component of ADCAT, there are also potential practical implications as well. In investigative 160 
interviews, where the veracity of interviewees’ accounts can strongly influence the outcome 161 
of the case (Berman, Narby, & Cutler, 1995), researchers have been keen to investigate 162 
strategies to promote honest disclosure and to deter deceit (see Rosenbaum, Billinger, & 163 
Stieglitz, 2014 for a review). However, depending on interviewees’ motivations for lying 164 
(i.e., if the lie will protect another from harm), they might still be inclined to provide a false 165 
report. For instance, in cases of maltreatment, victims often report that a barrier to disclosure 166 
is that they do not want to get the abuser into trouble (Beaulaurier, Seff, Newman, & Dunlop, 167 
2006; Lemaigre, Taylor & Gittoes, 2017). In these situations, it is important to know how 168 
different reasons to lie will influence cost-benefit calculations and, ultimately, final decisions 169 
to be honest or not. 170 
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Method 171 
Design 172 
 A within-subjects design was used, with reason to lie as the independent variable. 173 
Reason to lie was split by the beneficiary of the lie (self vs. another), and the presence of 174 
additional cost of lying (no cost (i.e., neutral) vs. cost to self/other). This resulted in four 175 
‘reasons to lie’ conditions: (1) Self-oriented with no cost to another (Self-Neutral), (2) Self-176 
oriented with a cost to another (Self-Cost), (3) Other-oriented with no cost to self (Other-177 
Neutral), and (4) Other-oriented with a cost to self (Other-Cost). The dependent measures 178 
were dichotomous decisions to lie or tell the truth and Likert scale ratings of the probability 179 
and valence of outcomes for truth-telling and lying for each reason to lie. 180 
Participants 181 
 Ninety-one first year undergraduate students (18 males), with an average age of 18.56 182 
years (SD = 1.47 years), were recruited to participate in this study. They took part in a lab 183 
induction exercise and did not receive credit for their participation. In terms of ethnicity, 61 184 
identified as White/Caucasian (67%), 12 as Asian (13.2%), 8 as Multiple/Mixed ethnic group 185 
(8.8%), 7 as Black/African/Caribbean (7.7%), 1 as ‘Other ethnic group’ (1.1%), and 2 did not 186 
specify their ethnicity (2.2%). 187 
Materials 188 
 Hypothetical scenarios. The four hypothetical scenarios were all set in an academic 189 
context and included situations in which undergraduate students might find themselves 190 
(similar to Masip et al., 2016). There were two scenarios where self-oriented lies could be 191 
told, and two where other-oriented lies could be told. These scenarios were then further split 192 
to manipulate the presence of an additional cost (i.e., harm) as introduced by Talwar, 193 
Williams, Renaud, Arruda, and Saykaly (2016). See the Supplementary Materials for the full 194 
scenarios. Prior to testing, the scenarios were piloted. The pilot exercise (with 14 195 
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participants) was undertaken to avoid issues of significantly uneven frequencies between 196 
decisions to lie and tell the truth, which resulted in Masip and colleagues (2016) having to 197 
withdraw numerous scenarios from their study. As a result of the pilot study, certain changes 198 
were made. Namely, the presentation of the probability rating scale was changed from 199 
decimal points (e.g., .5, .8), as used in Masip et al. (2016), to percentages (e.g., 50%, 80%) to 200 
aid responder comprehension. Furthermore, the self-oriented lie with no cost to self was 201 
considered to be too implausible, and so this was changed from a USB stick falling through a 202 
hole in a pocket and being kicked down a drain to a student misremembering a deadline and 203 
forgetting to put their phone on to charge, so the alarm did not go off.  204 
 Post-scenario questionnaire. The post-scenario questionnaire (see Appendix) firstly 205 
asked participants to make an initial decision to tell the truth or lie in the recently presented 206 
hypothetical scenario. The order of the truth/lie option was counterbalanced. Participants 207 
were then required to evaluate the anticipated outcomes of being believed/not believed and 208 
the probability of being believed/not believed, using a scale from 0% (will not happen) to 209 
100% (will certainly happen), and the desirability (i.e., valence) of the anticipated outcomes, 210 
using a scale from -5 (extremely undesirable) to +5 (extremely desirable) for both truth-211 
telling and lying for that particular scenario. This mirrored the rating scales used by Masip et 212 
al. (2016). From these ratings, the expected value of truth-telling, the expected value of lying, 213 
and motivation to lie could be calculated using the ADCAT formulae noted above and 214 
included in the Supplementary Materials. The order of appraisal for telling the truth and 215 
telling a lie was counterbalanced – that is, half of the sample evaluated the outcomes of 216 
telling the truth first, and the other half evaluated the outcomes of telling a lie first. Finally, 217 
participants were asked to make a final decision to tell the truth or lie based on their 218 
evaluations. The order of the truth/lie option mirrored the order of the truth/lie option for 219 
their initial decision. Changes from the initial decision to the final decision were coded. 220 
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Procedure 221 
 The study lasted approximately 30 minutes. In groups of eight to fifteen students, 222 
participants watched the four hypothetical scenarios via a Microsoft PowerPoint slideshow on 223 
a screen projection. Text and images were presented on the slides, with the text also being 224 
read aloud. The order of the scenarios was counterbalanced so that each vignette was never 225 
preceded nor followed by the same scenario more than once.  Immediately after watching 226 
each scenario, participants completed the post-scenario questionnaire (one questionnaire per 227 
scenario). To encourage impromptu decision-making, participants were encouraged to 228 
respond quickly and instinctively.  Participants were also instructed not to confer with their 229 
fellow participants; the research assistant was always present in the room to ensure that there 230 
was no conferring. Following the fourth vignette, participants were invited to complete a 231 
questionnaire that asked for age, gender and ethnicity. 232 
Results 233 
 Chi-squared testing was used to investigate differences in frequency between truth-234 
telling and lying across the four scenarios, point-biserial correlations were used to investigate 235 
relationships between ADCAT variables and expected decisions to lie or tell the truth, and 236 
multiple regression analyses were used to explore the moderating effects of the beneficiary of 237 
the lie and additional cost of lying. Preliminary analyses revealed no effects for any of the 238 
demographic variables, group session or order of presentation of scenarios on the statistical 239 
testing. Post-hoc power tests were performed using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & 240 
Buchner, 2007) to analyse sensitivity based on a sample of 91 participants, an alpha level of 241 
.05 and satisfactory power level of 80%. Results showed that, for the point-biserial 242 
correlations, the sample size was sufficient to find effect sizes of .25 and above, and for 243 
multiple regressions, the sample size was sufficient to find effect sizes of .07 and above. This 244 
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suggests that there is a minor risk of Type II error for small effect sizes (< .25) for the point-245 
biserial correlations. 246 
Frequency of lying 247 
 Table 1 displays the percentage of participants that made an initial and final decision 248 
to tell the truth or lie across the four scenarios. Participants indicated that they would lie 249 
significantly more than tell the truth for the self-oriented lie with no cost to another; 250 
conversely, they expected to tell the truth significantly more than lie for the self-oriented lie 251 
that incurred a cost to someone else. For other-oriented lies, the only difference in 252 
expectations for truth-telling and lying was when the lie had no cost to self. In this scenario, 253 
participants initially expected to lie significantly more than tell the truth; however, this 254 
difference became non-significant for final decisions for this scenario. This is most likely due 255 
to more participants changing their response from lie to truth than from truth to lie once they 256 
had evaluated truth/lying for that scenario, X2(1) = 4.46, p = .04. For the other three 257 
scenarios, changes in expected truth-telling/lying were equally distributed (p-values >.05). 258 
 Based on the recommendations of Masip et al. (2016), we analysed the frequency of 259 
truth/lie response and the absolute difference in percentage between truth/lie decisions 260 
because the split of binomial variables can affect point-biserial correlations. Masip et al. 261 
(2016) explained that small frequencies can often lack representativeness of the population 262 
due to outliers potentially distorting the results. Furthermore, they cite that Kemery, Dunlap, 263 
and Griffeth (1988) reported that variance could be restricted by uneven proportions in 264 
dichotomous variables, which can, in turn, underestimate correlations. Using the inclusion 265 
criteria suggested by Masip et al. (2016), we kept all scenarios where the frequency of truth-266 
telling/lying was above 10, and the absolute difference in percentage between truth/lie 267 
decisions was smaller than 75%. All four scenarios complied with both of these inclusion 268 
criteria. 269 
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ADCAT variables 270 
Point-biserial correlations (rpb) were used to examine the relationships between the 271 
ADCAT variables (expected value of truth-telling, the expected value of lying, and 272 
motivation to lie) and participants’ expected decision to lie (1) or tell the truth (0) across the 273 
four reasons to lie. This is in line with previous studies that have tested the Decision 274 
component of the ADCAT model (Masip et al., 2016; Walczyk et al., 2016). The descriptive 275 
statistics (means and standard deviations) for each of the ADCAT variables, as well as the 276 
point-biserial correlations between the ADCAT variables and the initial and final decision to 277 
tell a lie, are displayed in Table 2. All significant relationships between the ADCAT variables 278 
and expected decision to lie were in the predicted direction. Contrary to our predictions, the 279 
expected value of truth-telling was not related to a decision to lie for either of the self-280 
oriented lies (p-values >.05). 281 
Explorative testing 282 
 We performed hierarchical multiple regression analyses to determine the effect of 283 
expected values of truth-telling and lying, the beneficiary of the lie, additional cost and the 284 
interaction between these variables on the initial and final hypothetical decisions to lie (i.e., 285 
the outcome variables).  Accordingly, the expected value of truth-telling and the expected 286 
value of lying were entered as predictors at step 1, beneficiary of the lie (self-oriented = 0, vs. 287 
other-oriented = 1) and the additional cost of lying (no cost (i.e., neutral) = 0, vs. cost to 288 
self/other = 1) were dummy-coded and entered as moderators at step 2, and the interactions 289 
between each expected value and each moderator separately, and then each expected value 290 
and both moderators, were entered at step 3. 291 
 As can be seen in Table 3, at step 1, both expected value of truth-telling and expected 292 
value of lying contributed to the prediction of participants’ hypothetical decisions to lie, both 293 
initially, F(2, 361) = 27.94, p<.001, R2 = .13, and finally, F(2, 361) = 19.26, p<.001, R2 = .10. 294 
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Entering beneficiary of the lie and presence of additional cost did result in significant models 295 
for predicting both initial, F(4, 359) = 19.30, p<.001, R2 = .18, and final, F(4, 359) = 13.90, 296 
p<.001, R2 = .13, hypothetical decisions to lie. The inclusion of these variables significantly 297 
increased the amount of variance explained by both models (initial = ∆F(2, 359) = 9.37, 298 
p<.001, ∆R2 = .04. final = ∆F(2, 359) = 7.81, p<.001, ∆R2 = .04). However, as Table 3 shows, 299 
only additional cost was a significant predictor of both initial (ß = -.20, p<.001) and final (ß = 300 
-.20, p<.001) hypothetical decisions to lie. The negative correlations suggesting that the 301 
presence of an additional cost to self/other decreased the likelihood of a hypothetical decision 302 
to lie in the given scenario. The interaction variables entered at step 3 did result in significant 303 
models for predicting both initial, F(10, 353) = 8.28, p<.001, R2 = .19, and final, F(10, 353) = 304 
7.48, p<.001, R2 = .18, hypothetical decisions to lie. The inclusion of these variables 305 
significantly increased the amount of variance explained for final decision to lie, ∆F(6, 353) 306 
= 2.91, p = .009, ∆R2 = .04, but not for initial decision to lie, ∆F(6, 353) = .95, p = .46, ∆R2 = 307 
.01.  At step 3, however, the only significant predictors for final decision to lie were the 308 
expected value of lying (ß = .09, p<.001) and presence of additional cost (ß = -.21, p = .002). 309 
When the expected value of lying was higher, then there was a greater likelihood that the 310 
participant would decide to lie in the given scenario. Again, when there was an additional 311 
cost to self/other present, then there was a smaller likelihood that the participant would 312 
decide to lie in that hypothetical scenario. 313 
Discussion 314 
 Using the Decision formulae of the ADCAT model, the current study replicated 315 
previous research on whether deciding to tell the truth or a lie in a hypothetical scenario is 316 
related to the expected costs and benefits of truth-telling and lying. It was also the first study 317 
to look at how reason to lie can affect this decision-making process. In support of Walczyk et 318 
al. (2016) and Masip et al. (2016), positive associations were found between calculated 319 
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motivation to lie and expecting to decide to lie. Additionally, we found a positive relationship 320 
between the expected value of lying and deciding to lie, in line with Walczyk et al. (2016), 321 
but contrary to Masip et al. (2016). We also found that a negative relationship between the 322 
expected value of truth-telling and expecting to decide to lie only occurred when the lie was 323 
other-oriented. This is contrary to both of the previous studies that found this relationship in 324 
scenarios where the lies were predominantly self-oriented. 325 
A significant correlation for both prosocial lies suggests that Walczyk et al.’s (2014) 326 
overarching hypothesis of a negative relationship between the expected value of truth-telling 327 
and deciding to lie depends on who the lie benefits.  In the context of prosocial lies where 328 
there is the intention to act for the benefit of another (Dunbar et al., 2016; Lavoie et al., 329 
2016), it can be concluded that if a person decides to tell the truth, then another will primarily 330 
suffer the consequences.  The cost to another, therefore, forms the basis for calculating the 331 
expected value of truth-telling for prosocial lies and would explain why it is particularly 332 
important to consider in the decision-making process.  On the other hand, no significant 333 
relationship for self-oriented lies could be due to a Type II error, or that the primary victim of 334 
deciding to tell the truth when presented with an opportunity to tell an antisocial lie is 335 
oneself.  The findings of the current study suggest that the primary cost to another is 336 
considered more important than the primary cost to self when evaluating the cost and benefits 337 
of truth-telling. 338 
 Our exploration of the effects of reason to lie on the truth-telling/lying decision-339 
making process revealed neither beneficiary of the lie nor the additional cost of lying 340 
moderated the relationships between the expected values of truth-telling and lying and 341 
hypothetical decisions to tell a lie both initially and finally. That said, the additional cost was 342 
found to be a significant predictor in the second and third models for both initial and final 343 
decisions to lie. When the additional cost of lying was present (i.e., lying by blaming their 344 
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fellow student, or lying and taking the blame for their fellow student), participants were less 345 
likely to decide to lie. In terms of frequency, this resulted in a significant preference for 346 
telling the truth for self-oriented lies, with a cost to another, but no preference for truth-telling 347 
or lying for other-oriented lies, with a cost to self. Our initial prediction of a differential 348 
response to additional cost, based on whether it was to another at the benefit of the self or if it 349 
was to oneself at the benefit of another, was not supported. Indeed, our participants did not 350 
show a preference for expecting to act altruistically. Even though altruistic lies are considered 351 
to be more acceptable (Seiter et al., 2002), it could be that the need to protect someone else 352 
did not outweigh the suffering that the self would incur through the deception. That said, one 353 
could argue that a certain level of altruism is shown in the clear preference for telling the 354 
truth when the lie would protect the self to the detriment of another person. In this scenario, 355 
the participant is incurring a cost to themselves in order to protect another from potential 356 
harm. 357 
Theoretical implications 358 
 Our findings provide further support for the formulae in the Decision component of 359 
Activation-Decision-Construction-Action theory (ADCAT, Walczyk et al., 2014). The results 360 
also showed that additional cost to self or another should be considered as an external 361 
variable that can predict the expected value of lying and motivation to lie. However, more 362 
qualitative research is required to provide a more in-depth understanding of how outcomes of 363 
truth-telling and lying are perceived as benefits and costs, and whether these benefits and 364 
costs are psychological or materialistic (Vrij, 2008). This might further highlight the quasi-365 
rational decision-making process that underpins ADCAT (Walczyk et al., 2014). There are 366 
many other rational, or perhaps irrational, factors that might influence expected values of 367 
truth-telling/lying and, ultimately, decisions to lie. Indeed, individual factors, such as 368 
confidence in lying ability (Vrij, 2008), propensity to lie (Serota & Levine, 2015), and 369 
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fantasy proneness (Merckelbach, 2004) could affect these calculations, as well as contextual 370 
factors, such as who the lie is told to (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Furthermore, participants’ 371 
strategies for telling a convincing lie may have differed affecting their confidence in telling a 372 
lie and being believed. 373 
Practical applications 374 
 The current findings demonstrated the complex thought process involved in truth/lie 375 
decision-making. In particular, the perceived benefits and costs of a decision to oneself and 376 
others were associated with participants’ truth/lie decision-making. For other-oriented lies, 377 
the suggestion would be that increasing the expected value of truth-telling and decreasing the 378 
expected value of lying could result in less motivation to tell a lie. For self-oriented lies, the 379 
suggestion would be to only focus on decreasing the value of lying to deter motivation to 380 
deceive. Whether these suggestions actually promote honesty and deter deception requires 381 
further testing. Developmental research on child deception has found that methods for 382 
increasing the value of telling the truth significantly increase children’s willingness to 383 
truthfully disclose transgressions. These methods include: (1) having the eyewitness promise 384 
to tell the truth (e.g., Evans & Lee, 2010; Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2002); (2) reducing 385 
any of the perceived negative consequences of truth-telling (Talwar, Arruda, & Yachison, 386 
2015); and (3) information or stories that highlight the benefits of honesty (e.g., Lee et al., 387 
2014; Talwar, Yachison & Leduc, 2016). To date, research into the Decision component of 388 
ADCAT has shown cost-benefits calculations are related to adults’ decision-making for (1) 389 
minor transgressions (Masip et al., 2016), (2) mock job interviews (Walczyk et al., 2016), 390 
and (3) academic transgressions (the current study) using predominantly undergraduate 391 
samples. Before these techniques can be used by police investigators to promote true and 392 
deter false eyewitness accounts, more research is required to understand whether these 393 
relationships can be manipulated to change truth-telling/lying behaviour in adults, whether 394 
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this applies to a more general population, and whether the ADCAT variables relate to 395 
decisions regarding more serious and high-stakes lies. 396 
Methodological considerations 397 
 Akin to previous studies that have investigated the frequency of deceptive behaviour 398 
(Argo, White & Dahl, 2006), the current study used hypothetical scenarios. The limitation of 399 
this method is that there is no certainty that participants will respond truthfully about their 400 
willingness to deceive. It could also be that a decision to deceive might not translate into 401 
actual lying if they found themselves in the situation. Walczyk et al. (2016) resolved this 402 
issue by asking participants in their study to actually lie on the spot during mock job 403 
interviews. This study showed that the relationship between ADCAT variables and actual 404 
truth-telling/lying behaviour did exist. Other studies have demonstrated how hypothetical 405 
scenarios of dishonesty can be translated into real tasks (e.g., cheating in Shu, Gino & 406 
Bazerman’s, 2011 study). However, these scenarios are still a far cry from police 407 
investigations where telling a lie can have serious and long-term legal implications. Future 408 
research should try to create more forensically relevant scenarios in which the Decision 409 
component of ADCAT can be tested, without encountering ethical issues. 410 
 In the post-scenario questionnaire, the questions were focussed on collecting the 411 
relevant data that could be inputted into the ADCAT formulae. This meant that other 412 
questions regarding participants’ understanding of the study and the scenarios was 413 
overlooked. This information would further expand the current findings and provide insights 414 
into the relationship between the decision to lie and construction of lies.  415 
Conclusion 416 
 Cost-benefit calculations of lying were associated with decisions to lie; however, the 417 
cost-benefits calculation of truth-telling were only associated with other-oriented lies. 418 
Additional cost significantly predicted the expected value of lying and motivation to lie. The 419 
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presence of a cost to another significantly reversed participants’ preference for telling a self-420 
oriented lie. For other-oriented lies, an additional cost to oneself resulted in no preference for 421 
deciding to lie or tell the truth. The current study builds upon previous research on the 422 
Decision component of ADCAT and presents the first explorative testing of predictions 423 
regarding the influence of reason to lie on the formulae within this component. Further 424 
confirmative research is required to replicate our findings (Wigboldus & Dotsch, 2016). 425 
Future studies should also look to use larger and more diverse samples and investigate 426 
ADCAT in more forensically relevant scenarios where participants actually lie or tell the 427 
truth.  428 
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Appendix 452 
Vignette questionnaire to assess ADCAT variables of the Decision component 453 
 454 
SCENARIO 1 455 
 456 
All of the questions below refer to the scenario that you have just watched and that scenario only. 457 
 458 
1. If you were in this situation, what would you decide to do?  Circle one response below. 459 
 460 
TELL A LIE  TELL THE TRUTH  461 
 462 
 463 
Regardless of how you answered Question 1, please answer the following questions: 464 
 465 
 466 
2. If you were to tell a lie in this situation and were believed, what do you think would 467 
happen? 468 
 469 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 470 
 471 
3. What is the probability that your lie would be believed and your answer to Question 2 472 
would happen? 473 
 474 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Will not happen  Will certainly happen 
 475 
4. Overall, how desirable is the outcome for your response to Question 2? 476 
 477 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Extremely 
undesirable Neutral Extremely desirable 
 478 
5. If you were to tell a lie in this situation and were not believed, what do you think would 479 
happen? 480 
 481 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 482 
 483 
6. Overall, how desirable is the outcome for your response to Question 5? 484 
 485 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Extremely 
undesirable Neutral Extremely desirable 
 486 
7. If you were to tell the truth in this situation and were believed, what do you think would 487 
happen? 488 
 489 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 490 
 491 
8. What is the probability that your truth would be believed and your answer to Question 7 492 
would happen? 493 
 494 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
Will not happen  Will certainly happen 
 495 
9. Overall, how desirable is the outcome for your response to Question 7? 496 
 497 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
DECIDING TO DECEIVE FOR DIFFERENT REASONS 
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Extremely 
undesirable Neutral Extremely desirable 
 498 
 499 
10. If you were to tell the truth in this situation and were not believed, what do you think 500 
would happen? 501 
 502 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 503 
 504 
11. Overall, how desirable is the outcome for your response to Question 11? 505 
 506 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Extremely 
undesirable Neutral Extremely desirable 
  507 
12. Regardless of how you answered Question 1, after considering your responses for 508 
Question 2 to 11, what would you decide to do if you were in this situation? 509 
Circle one response below. 510 
 511 
TELL A LIE  TELL THE TRUTH  512 
 513 
13. If you have changed your decision from Question 1, why? 514 
If you would act the same as you responded to Question 1, please write N/A below. 515 
 516 
...................................................................................................................................................... 517 
 518 
...................................................................................................................................................... 519 
 520 
 521 
 522 
 523 
 524 
 525 
 526 
 527 
 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
 537 
 538 
 539 
 540 
 541 
 542 
 543 
 544 
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Table 1     
 665 
Percentage of Initial and Final Truth/Lie Decisions as a function of Reason to Lie 
 Initial decision Final decision 
Reason to lie Truth (%) Lie (%) X2 Truth (%) Lie (%) X2 
Self-Neutral 33 67 10.56** 37 63 5.81* 
Self-Cost 70 30 15.04*** 69 31 13.46*** 
Other-Neutral 35 65 8.01** 42 58 2.46 
Other-Cost 52   48 .10  59  41 3.18 
* p<.05 
** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
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Table 2      
 681 
Descriptive Statistics and Point-Biserial Correlations (rpb) for ADCAT Variables and Decisions to 
Lie as a function of Reason to Lie 
   Decision to lie 
Reason to lie ADCAT Variables M (SD) Initial (rpb) Final (rpb) 
Self-Neutral Expected value of truth-telling -2.61 (2.71) -.05 -.05 
Expected value of lying -.19 (1.93) .32** .35*** 
Motivation to lie 2.42 (3.35) .22* .24* 
Self-Cost Expected value of truth-telling -2.38 (2.63) -.14 -.15 
Expected value of lying -1.75 (2.62) .27** .28** 
Motivation to lie .63 (3.67) .29** .31** 
Other-Neutral Expected value of truth-telling -2.34 (2.06) -.15 -.27** 
Expected value of lying -.48 (2.67) .21* .33** 
Motivation to lie 1.86 (3.34) .26* .43*** 
Other-Cost Expected value of truth-telling -1.75 (2.64) -.24* -.35** 
Expected value of lying -1.03 (2.26) .33** .32** 
Motivation to lie .73 (3.39) .40*** .49*** 
* p <.05 
** p <.01 
*** p <.001 
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 683 
 684 
 685 
 686 
 687 
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 690 
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 692 
 693 
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Table 3 695 
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Decisions to Lie  
Variables entered Decision to lie 
 Initial Final 
 ß ß ß ß ß ß 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Expected value of truth-telling 
(EVtruth) 
 
-.03** -.03** -.02 -.03** -.03** -.02 
Expected value of lying (EVlie) 
 
.07*** .06*** .08** .06*** .05*** .09*** 
Beneficiary of the lie 
 
 
.08 .04 
 
.02 -.09 
Presence of additional cost 
 
 
-.20*** -.22** 
 
-.20*** -.21** 
EVtruth X Beneficiary of the lie 
 
  
-.002 
  
-.04 
EVlie X Beneficiary of the lie 
 
  
-.004 
  
-.03 
EVtruth X Presence of 
additional cost 
 
  
.003 
  
-.006 
EVlie X Presence of addtional 
cost 
 
  
-.03 
  
-.04 
EVtruth X Beneficiary of the lie 
X Additional cost 
 
  
-.04 
  
.03 
EVlie X Beneficiary of the lie X 
Additional cost 
  
.06 
  
-.05 
R2 
 
.13 .18 .19 .10 .13 .18 
Model F 
 
27.94*** 19.30*** 8.28*** 19.26*** 13.90*** 7.48*** 
∆R2 
 
 .04 .01  .04 .04 
∆F  9.37*** .95  7.81*** 2.91** 
* p <.05 
** p <.01 
*** p <.001 
 696 
 697 
 698 
